Beyond TRIPP: The Politics of Regional Connectivity in the South Caucasus

| Insights, Politics, Armenia, Azerbaijan

On 8 August 2025, Armenia and the United States signed a memorandum on connectivity in Washington, alongside the initialing of the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) initially aimed to connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan, its significance extends beyond the approximately 42 kilometers of Armenian territory involved. Rather, the route should be viewed in the context of wider efforts to connect the region, particularly the South Caucasus, with Europe and Asia, while also establishing an additional transport route between the two continents.

When discussing regional connectivity, it is important to distinguish between TRIPP and Armenia's broader Crossroads of Peace initiative, an infrastructural and political project aimed at developing transport connections along both east–west and north–south axes and transforming Armenia into a regional connectivity hub. Although the two initiatives differ in scope, they are closely interconnected.

Moreover, regional connectivity is not only about infrastructure but also has political, economic and geopolitical dimensions. To assess the full potential benefits of TRIPP and the Crossroads of Peace, it is therefore necessary to zoom out and examine not only the development of regional transport networks, but also the differing political and economic interests that could determine whether Armenia becomes a regional connectivity hub or remains primarily a transit route between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. 

Two initiatives: TRIPP and Crossroads of Peace

Although both initiatives differ in scope, it would be misleading to view them as completely separate initiatives. While TRIPP focuses on the approximately 42-kilometre section in southern Armenia, the Crossroads of Peace initiative, launched by the Armenian government, is a broader project encompassing various regional connectivity routes, including north–south and east–west connections, as well as TRIPP itself.

TRIPP itself is an infrastructure project to be developed by a joint US–Armenian company, in which the United States is expected to hold 74% of the shares and Armenia 26%. The route should be seen as a compromise between Azerbaijan's demand for unimpeded access to Nakhchivan through Armenian territory and Armenia's insistence that, while the route may be managed by third parties, it must remain under Armenian territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction.

While Armenia and the United States have already signed a framework agreement for TRIPP, several questions regarding its implementation and possible third-party participation remain partly unanswered. Moreover, the project will not only serve its primary purpose of connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan but will also represent an American economic asset in the region. TRIPP is also expected to encompass more than road infrastructure, with plans for railways, energy infrastructure, including gas pipelines, and fibre-optic cables, making it a comprehensive regional connectivity project.

The Crossroads of Peace initiative, on the other hand, should not be understood as a legally binding framework but rather as a broader, less formally institutionalized initiative proposed by the Armenian government to develop regional connectivity and transform Armenia into a regional connectivity hub. It envisages the development of road networks, tunnels and railways, as well as transport connections linking Armenia with Azerbaijan on the one hand and Türkiye on the other.

Beyond TRIPP

While TRIPP is already attracting financial and political attention, the approximately 42-kilometer section through Armenian territory will not realize its full potential without further connections to Türkiye and Europe. Without further connections to Türkiye, TRIPP's role would be reduced to a section primarily connecting mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan, which would limit its potential benefits for other regional actors.

Besides the continuation of TRIPP through Nakhchivan and Türkiye, Armenia aims to foster other connections between Azerbaijan and Türkiye through northern Armenia. More precisely, these include road connections through Sotk and towards the Turkish border, as well as the railway connection through Gyumri and Akhurik. Another possible connection would be the reconstruction of the railway section between the Armenian village of Yeraskh and Nakhchivan, which would also connect Yerevan with Armenia's southern province of Syunik through Nakhchivan. These additional routes are important because they would allow Armenia to benefit from regional connectivity beyond the implementation of TRIPP itself.

A route through northern Armenia connecting Azerbaijan with Türkiye would provide additional benefits for Armenia, making it a direct transit country between the two states. However, all three states have different perspectives on the connections between Armenia and Türkiye. More specifically, Baku is interested in maintaining its role in regional connectivity and Armenia–Türkiye relations. Against this background, a direct connection and the opening of the border between Armenia and Türkiye could be less beneficial for Azerbaijan, as they would reduce Baku's role in Armenia–Türkiye relations and its potential role as a transit country between the two neighbors.

From the Turkish perspective, there are two projects connecting Türkiye to the South Caucasus, or more particularly to Armenia and Azerbaijan. The first project is the Kars–Iğdır–Aralık–Dilucu railway, connecting eastern Anatolia directly with Nakhchivan. The second project would be to reconstruct and reactivate the railway between Kars and Gyumri through Akyaka and Akhurik.

From a financial perspective, the Kars–Gyumri railway connection could require less investment, because much of the infrastructure already exists and primarily needs to be renovated. On the other hand, the construction of a new railway connecting Türkiye directly with Nakhchivan would require considerably higher investments. Moreover, the latter project could require a longer period of time to become operational.

Thus, while connecting Türkiye directly to Nakhchivan may involve a shorter distance, the Kars–Gyumri connection, from the Turkish perspective, could be considerably less costly and would create additional direct connections with Armenia, bypassing potential transit costs through Azerbaijan.

According to estimates presented by the AMBERD Research Center, transport routes through Armenia could shorten the distance between China and Europe by approximately 5–10%, while the distance between Armenia and Eastern Europe could be shortened by 10–25%. These figures further demonstrate the potential economic benefits of developing additional connectivity routes through Armenia.

While Turkish officials from different ministries and business representatives see the benefits of connecting Türkiye directly with Armenia and opening the border between the two states, the Turkish political leadership, partly influenced by Azerbaijan's position, has been prioritizing the Türkiye–Nakhchivan railway project, without ruling out the Kars–Gyumri option. For example, in April 2026, a joint Armenian–Turkish working group met in Kars to discuss the renovation and operationalization of the railway. Türkiye has also confirmed the importance of connectivity with Armenia. The interest of the Turkish business community in opening the Armenian–Turkish border is, among other things, underlined by the recent reciprocal visits of Armenian and Turkish business representatives, including meetings in Kars in June and Yerevan in September 2026. 

Taking into account that Yerevan and its surrounding metropolitan area are relatively well developed compared to several regions of eastern Anatolia, Armenia could attract Turkish citizens for various reasons after the border opens. First, to use Zvartnots International Airport for connections to other destinations, including Istanbul and Ankara. Second, to use medical services in Armenia, and third, to foster trade between the two countries. This is not because Armenia is more developed than Türkiye, but because certain communities in eastern Türkiye are geographically closer to Yerevan than to major Turkish urban centers.

However, due to political considerations and Türkiye's decision to link the Armenian–Turkish normalization process to progress in Armenian–Azerbaijani relations, it remains uncertain when the Turkish government will open the border and make the Kars–Gyumri route operational.

The recent tensions between Ankara and Baku over restrictions on wearing hijabs in Azerbaijani schools, as well as their differing relations with Israel and political positions regarding Israel, may open a window of opportunity for Armenia and Türkiye to advance their bilateral connectivity projects. However, it remains uncertain whether these tensions will have any concrete impact on Türkiye's approach towards Armenia.

Beyond Infrastructure: Political and Institutional Challenges 

One of the major political obstacles to unblocking regional communications, as mentioned before, is the opening of the Armenian–Turkish border. While Armenia is politically and infrastructurally ready to open the border, Ankara continues to link the normalization process to developments in Armenian–Azerbaijani relations.

Another potential partner in the region is the European Union. While Brussels is interested in engaging in regional connectivity in order not to become a bystander, its practical role remains restricted by several obstacles. EU engagement could take place at different levels, including feasibility studies and direct infrastructure investments. This is already underlined by the EU's involvement, together with Azerbaijan and the EBRD, in a feasibility study for the Nakhchivan railway project. Brussels could benefit from regional connectivity in two ways: first, by strengthening its political influence in the region, and second, by creating additional transit routes between Asia and Europe. However, questions regarding possible third-party participation in TRIPP remain unanswered.

A further obstacle to potential European Union investments in the Crossroads of Peace initiative, particularly its railway network, is Russia's existing concession to manage Armenia's railway system. From a European perspective, investments in infrastructure managed by a Russian company could raise concerns about sanctions and the possibility of indirectly benefiting Moscow. In this context, Armenia is looking for a political rather than a purely legal solution to the concession issue between Yerevan and Moscow.

According to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, sufficient legal grounds exist to terminate the concession agreement. However, the prime minister has underlined that Armenia is willing to find a political and friendly solution to the issue in order not to create additional tensions with Moscow.

One possible solution could be transferring the concession rights to a third party, specifically a country acceptable to both Yerevan and Moscow. This could also help unblock potential investments by the European Union.

Another challenge concerns Iran's position on TRIPP. Tehran initially opposed the project, arguing that it could create additional security risks for Iran. Since the Washington agreements of 8 August 2025, however, the Iranian position has become more nuanced. During the COP17 summit in Yerevan in October 2026, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran trusts Armenia and is confident that Yerevan will not take any steps against Iranian security. At the same time, Tehran continues to express concerns about a possible US presence in the region.

One of Armenia's strategies for maintaining relations with both Iran and the United States has been to maintain transparency and consultations with Tehran and Washington regarding the implementation of TRIPP.

Armenia’s Transformation into a Regional Connectivity Hub

The establishment of TRIPP, as well as the broader Crossroads of Peace initiative, including the road and railway networks in northern Armenia, could enable Armenia to become a regional connectivity hub for the entire region rather than serving primarily as a transit route between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. 

This could benefit several regional actors, including Türkiye and Iran. First, Türkiye would gain direct access to Central Asia and vice versa. Second, through a direct connection between Armenia and Türkiye, Ankara could reduce Baku's influence on Turkish–Armenian relations. Third, regional actors, including Türkiye and Azerbaijan, would have additional transport routes besides those passing through Georgia, thus reducing Georgia's dominant role as a transit country. Beyond transport infrastructure, the projects could also foster regional cooperation in the energy sector.

Against the background that Crossroads of Peace aims to connect not only east to west but also north to south, Iran could be another beneficiary of the initiative. We can already witness joint Armenian–Iranian construction projects, particularly tunnel construction in the Syunik region, underlining Iran's economic, political and infrastructural interests in the region. The opening of consulates by different countries in Syunik further illustrates the growing international interest in the region, including its strategic and connectivity potential.

At the same time, it should be mentioned that, from the Georgian perspective, Armenia's connectivity ambitions could reduce Tbilisi's role as a transit country between Azerbaijan and Türkiye, Armenia and Türkiye, as well as Armenia and Russia. This is particularly relevant given the principle of reciprocal connectivity outlined in the Washington Declaration of 8 August 2025, which could also allow Armenia to benefit from transport routes through Azerbaijani territory, including potential connections to Russia.

When it comes to Armenia's interests and benefits, several points can be underlined. First, Armenia could attract new investments through its expanded role in regional connectivity. Second, by opening the Armenian–Turkish border and reactivating the Kars–Gyumri railway connection, Armenia would gain an additional transport route to both the European Union and Arab countries, which in turn would support Armenia's diversification ambitions. Third, US investments and economic activity in Armenia could create an additional economic deterrent against renewed conflict in the context of Armenian–Azerbaijani relations, while potentially creating some uncertainty for Iran. Last but not least, transport and potential energy connectivity between Armenia and Azerbaijan could create further interdependencies, thereby increasing the cost of a renewed conflict.

Conclusion

The current developments and discussions surrounding regional connectivity illustrate that TRIPP could make an important contribution to peace, stability and connectivity in the region. However, it is also true that TRIPP alone, without broader connectivity projects such as the Crossroads of Peace initiative and further connections through Türkiye, will not unfold its full potential. Armenia would remain primarily a transit country between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan rather than becoming a regional connectivity hub.

Thus, the success of regional connectivity depends on broader infrastructure initiatives covering roads, railways and energy connectivity. At the same time, connectivity should not be reduced to its infrastructural dimension alone but should also be considered from economic and political perspectives. In order to unblock regional connectivity, certain obstacles need to be overcome, including the opening of the Armenian–Turkish border, Russia's management concession over Armenia's railway system, and the uncertainties surrounding Iran–US relations.

Ultimately, the success of TRIPP should not only be measured by the implementation of the approximately 42-kilometer route through Armenia, but also by the implementation of a broader regional connectivity network, particularly the Crossroads of Peace initiative, that serves the interests of Armenia and other regional actors.

Contributed by Konstantin Ghazaryan, a political analyst and policy practitioner specializing in international relations, European foreign and security policy, and the South Caucasus. He is a Senior Analyst at the Yerevan Center of Foreign and Security Policy and previously served as Adviser to the Secretary of Armenia's Security Council. He also held political advisory positions in Austria, including in the Austrian Parliament.

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