Upon taking office, President Donald Trump issued a series of executive orders, including “Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid,” which called for a 90-day pause in new foreign assistance obligations and disbursements pending review. This was followed by “stop-work” orders for all existing foreign assistance awards worldwide. The State Department noted that “every dollar we spend, every program we fund, and every policy we pursue must make America safer, stronger, and more prosperous.” USAID was no longer seen as fulfilling this mission, and the organization’s website went dark on February 1.

In 2024, USAID left a funding gap of $340 million in the South Caucasus. Approximately one-third of this budget was allocated to Georgia ($91 million), while two-thirds ($250 million) went to Armenia. There was limited or no spending in Azerbaijan, as Baku halted cooperation with the agency in June 2024, citing concerns over U.S. political objectives in the region.

Overall, U.S. funds in the region had been allocated to development, democracy promotion, peace, security, and education initiatives. To understand the significance of the vacuum left behind, we turn to Lincoln Mitchell, a foreign policy practitioner with years of experience in the post-Soviet space, including the Caucasus. Currently teaching at the School of International and Public Affairs and the Department of Political Science at Columbia University, Mitchell previously served as Chief of Party for the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Georgia for two years around the time of the Rose Revolution. He has also advised, consulted, and evaluated dozens of USAID programs in more than 30 countries. In 2016, he published The Democracy Promotion Paradox, a book focusing on the inconsistencies of U.S. soft power, with case studies from Georgia, Ukraine, and Iraq.

If you were a U.S. Ambassador somewhere in Eastern Europe for 70 years, you knew you could wield power. You would have access to USAID, a few fellowships, Radio Free Europe, the National Endowment for Democracy, and various networks and instruments they could deploy. You had the National Democratic Institute and the Republican National Institute coming on the sidelines to bridge the globe directly with the Congress and Senate. Then you had the CIA. You have been associated with all these networks worldwide. How big a vacuum do we have now? What is left? 

Well, the challenge in answering that question is that something may change by the time I open my mouth, and this discussion goes to print. My first response is that the military network is still in place, but I am not even sure of that anymore. Almost all of what we might call soft power tools are gone or will be gone very soon if this continues. I like this phrase ‘soft power’ because it suggests that besides military power—you know, your tanks and guns—we are still talking about “power.” Like it or not, it is an assertion that furthers American interests. 

For a long time, it was the understanding of both our political parties that since World War II, the growth of democracy, stability, and avoiding shooting wars were things we could get by using all these tools. Part of the problem is that part of our power was our stability. So, when you refer to the American Ambassador, the discretionary funds, and all these ways to create opportunities—with organizations like NDI, IRI, and many others—you know that these were going to be there, and that was not going to change because of an election in the United States. Now, you do not know that anymore. 

The best-case scenario is that the Democrats win back the House in 2026 and the White House in 2028, and I don’t know if that’s going to happen. Assuming a Whitmer, Shapiro, Buttigieg or Kamala Harris campaign could take back the White House, much of the damage will be done. This is not something you can turn on and off.  The damage is severe here. 

Now, I am not in the business of giving relationship advice. But I am reminded of this lyric by the Jewish Canadian songwriter Leonard Cohen: “Everybody knows that you’ve been faithful, give or take a night or two.” If you’ve been faithful give or take out a night or two’, of course, you’ve not been faithful. Similarly, if a country is stable, except for an administration or two, you have not been stable. Stability is our greatest soft power, perhaps our greatest power. It will take the rest of my lifetime to rebuild that sense of being stable, if it ever gets rebuilt. And for those reading this, I am old but not that old.”

Focusing specifically on the Caucasus: in Armenia, USAID money funded water resource management; in Georgia, it was used to train judiciary and prosecutors to do things differently. Organized crime, controlling biological agents, fighting transnational crime: all this was done by a myriad of agencies. You've seen things from the inside. How big is the policy development gap? Is there any mitigation on the American side?

The gap is bigger than you are suggesting. USAID was working with civil society. Ideally, civil society is constituency-based. In the South Caucasus, we are talking about elite civil society groupings. But they're still doing valuable work. In Georgia, {this withdrawal} comes at a key time. Today is the 100^th consecutive day of demonstrations against what I believe to be an increasingly authoritarian regime. It is a very big deal that the U.S. sent the message that it does not have your back financially but also politically. 

Think of Armenia. Let’s say you are doing a project with the judiciary or the legislature. You work with the Speaker of Parliament, who benefits from the meeting with the Ambassador. At the same time, the implicit message is that people who work with USAID or the National Endowment for Democracy do not get arrested. If you did arrest an activist, people in the US Senate or the Congress they would care. But, if you arrest an activist supported by USAID or the NED, people in Congress will care-and they could create a lot of trouble in a small country. Now, there is not much we can do to push for democracy. We do not have the resources, and there is no political appetite from the top to do this kind of thing. 

Going back to your first question, which brings us to the U.S. Embassy somewhere, we must realize that the United States that you knew from 1945 until 2015 no longer exists. That is our point of departure when thinking of the biggest, most significant conflict for global politics today, which is in Ukraine. Ukraine is a country that is facing up to a brutal, aggressive, authoritarian, expansionist, and dangerous leader of a very powerful country. We are obviously taking about Russia. I'm not new to this subject. I've spent time in Ukraine, and I believe that supporting Ukraine is a very important project. Our former President, Joe Biden, did a pretty good job threading a tough needle there. Under Trump, we have switched sides. 

Now, I hate 1930s analogies. I come from a Jewish-American family who, for several reasons, were deeply anti-fascist. During the Spanish Civil War, the American government did not stand by the Republicans, but there were volunteers called the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. For my grandparents, that was the most important political project at the time. Eventually, America joined the Second World War. If we have to make analogies with the 1930s, Imagine Roosevelt looking around at the time and saying, ‘you know what, I quite like Franco, Mussolini, and Hitler and we will support the fascists in Spain.” Imagine if we had sided with the fascists. 

It is hard for Americans to process this, but this is what we are talking about. I have been asked, “What if the Georgian government becomes authoritarian.” I have said, if that happened Washington would take the side of the authoritarians now. I am not naïve. I know that in the past, we have supported nasty regimes like Chile and South Africa. But since the end of the Cold War, we have tried to do things differently. That power does not exist anymore. We're trying to pick a fight with two NATO countries. This is a different world.

Going back to the region, we are waiting for the new Ambassadors, who will have fewer tools at their disposal. But there is an additional fear. Can you see a world where U.S. embassies throw everyone they used to talk to under the bus, say because they are “too woke,” and decide they want new faces to discuss American interests? That fear seems to cut across Europe. 

It's a bit too early to tell. You need to know a bit about how U.S. Ambassadors are appointed. There are three tiers: First, the biggest tier is the foreign service people. These are top-notch professionals, experienced, trained, with language skills, and know how to work in the region. They know what they're doing. Then, we have political appointments in big countries to oversee important relationships the President wants to monitor. Examples: Mike McFaul served Barack Obama in Moscow, and Ford appointed George H.W. Bush to the People’s Republic of China. 

Then we have the third tier of people who buy an ambassadorship. People do not want to buy an ambassadorship in the Caucasus for one of these postings. The exception might be a rich, conservative Armenian American. Overall, the region will likely see foreign service appointments. Their boss will be the Secretary of State. 

So, you are not likely to see a “change of guard” who will change every interlocutor they worked with, declaring them “woke.”

You know, Washington started supporting LGBTQ rights groups when Hillary Clinton became Secretary of State, while it was still a contested civil rights issue domestically. But it was always a divisive subject. There was never a consensus. I can imagine that if you cannot use the term “diversity” in DC, you don’t do that in Embassies. 

I can imagine that gay activists being bitten up will not have the backing of the U.S. government. In the past, if you beat up an activist working with USAID, you had a really big problem. Now, it may well be the case that our authorities will stand by while anti-gay legislation is pushed through in different countries. Their allegiances stand with Orban-like political factions. This administration will not push for democracy or civil rights in the Caucasus or elsewhere. 

The human rights agenda is no longer important. Business is. They will be focusing on Azerbaijan’s oil wealth. Georgian nuts and wine will not be that attractive. In terms of money, Armenia and Georgia are “small potatoes.” That’s the direction. 

They may also care about oppressed Christian minorities. Georgia is overwhelming Christian. There are proselytizing Christian denominations that are not welcome. The Trump-Musk regime and the people around them believe that in America, white Christians are the most oppressed group. So, you can see that if there's a small Christian community in Azerbaijan and they're not treated well, the Ambassador would get upset. We know they are breaking things down, but we don’t know what’s coming. 

Is there coherence in transactionalism? For example, the Armenian vote was important in Michigan or Philadelphia. Does this provide Armenian Americans with an angle?

The Armenian power base is primarily in California, where they mainly vote Republican. I remember the Republican Governor of California, George Deukmejian, who was part of Reagan’s support base. Reagan was the first to recognize the Armenian Genocide. I am not a big fan of the Republican President, but he was right to do that and did it for good reasons. 

No significant Georgian or Azerbaijani Diaspora could make a difference in U.S. politics. Again, Diaspora politics are peculiar. The Ukrainian Diaspora is important in Pennsylvania, and they voted for Trump. Jewish Americans, despite Trump’s alleged hawkish support for Israel, overwhelmingly voted for Kamala Harris. 

I hear often, “Trump is a real estate guy and is transactional.” He is transactional in asking ‘what’s in it for me.’ But he is no businessman. He didn't work for his money. He is an heir. I am from New York. I know a lot of people in the real estate business who think Trump was a moron, inheriting money and ending up with less than he originally had until he became a grifter. He is not making good deals. Similarly, it is not clear what he wants from every country. We don't want anything from Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, except maybe Putin wants something. Trump tends to respond to Putin's wishes. 

If the US is pulling away from the region and the Euro-Atlantic umbrella is no longer what it used to be, what is Turkey's role in the region? 

From a governance perspective, Turkey is not a bastion of liberal democratic values. Erdogan fits in the Modi-Orban-Trump grouping. On the other hand, Turkey has long-standing relationships with two countries in the region and a long-standing enmity with the third. Turkey was the pillar of NATO’s Eastern Flank forever. 

Small “d” democrats in the region need to build our networks without USAID money. They have a transnational fascist movement. We need a transnational democratic movement. To answer your question, I imagine Turkey’s role will be determined by the positioning of all other powers, including China, which is close to becoming the most potent power in the world.

The U.S. is about to withdraw sanctions from Russia but not from Iran. We also have sanctions in place for members of the Georgian government. Do you seek collision between policies? Is someone looking out for coherence? 

No, and that will get worse. Mid-level people in the State Department who haven't lost their jobs yet are concerned with coherence. You have this very dysfunctional situation where a Secretary of State – whom I don't like but is a normal Secretary of State – can be humiliated. Decisions are cohesive if they stay in the State Department. Beyond there, cohesion is lost. 

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis